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This  paper links debates around technology, materiality and affect to generate a theory of 
inorganically organised objects and affects. Drawing upon the work of Bernard Stiegler 
and Felix Guattari, the paper suggests  that technical objects  can be understood as as-
semblages of matter, which are organised by material thresholds that shape their capacity 
to affect. The paper then argues that technical affects  are transmitted via material medi-
ums such as air that it terms associated milieus. To understand the affective capacities  of 
technology, one should understand how technologies reorganise and draw upon associ-
ated milieus’ to generate affect and how the material thresholds of objects shape what 
these affects are. Developing a number of examples, the paper shows how inorganically 
organised affect reorganise the body and corporeally affects  capacities  to act and respond 
to the world. In conclusion the paper suggests an account of affect that focuses on objects 
has methodological implications for social scientists interested in studying technical proc-
esses and environments. 
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1.Introduction
Affect is now a widely discussed issue in the humanities and social sciences (see Mas-
sumi 2002, Connolly 2011, Dawney 2011, Pile 2009, Bondi and Davidson 2011, Curti et al 
2011, Leys 2011). On a basic level affect has most often been understood as the ‘capacity 
to affect and be affected’ (see Thrift 2004). Beyond this basic definition there are many 
particular theories of affect, all emergent from their own theoretical schools  and traditions 
and each with their own ontological and epistemological baggage (such as post-
structuralism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology etc). Perhaps the most popular of these 
theories is  Gilles Deleuze’s account of affect, itself drawn from the work of Benedict Spi-
noza and modified and publicised through the work of Brian Massumi (2002) and William 
Connolly (1999), amongst others. For Deleuze (1988), affect is the outcome of the encoun-
ter between entities  and how entities are affected by these encounters. Examples include 
how a plant may be affected by water, which causes it to grow, and how an animal may be 
affected by poison, which causes it to die. Rather than defined by their substance, size or 
species, Deleuze (ibid, 124) suggests that human and non-human entities  can be defined 
and compared through their affects. For example, from this affective perspective, a sports 
car and a race horse have more in common than a race horse and a cow because the 
sports  car and race horse share more affects (such as a capacity for speed or an ability to 
manoeuvre quickly). 
With this perspective in mind the aim of this paper is to modify Deleuze’s theory of affect 
using the work of philosophers Felix Guattari and Bernard Stiegler to generate a theory of 
technical objects  and affects it terms inorganically organised objects  and inorganically or-
ganised affects. Briefly, inorganically organised objects can be understood as assem-
blages of manufactured components that allow an object to perform some kind of task or 
activity. Inorganically organised affects  can be defined as affects that are shaped by and 
emerge from these objects. The potential for an affect to be generated by a technical ob-
ject, is, in turn, shaped by what could be termed the material relations between compo-
nents that make up an object and the absolute material thresholds that define an object by 
what it can do.  Material relations  between components can be understood as the range of 
movements, changes and translations that are required for a technology to undergo its 
normal operations. For example, an Apple iPad will only operate if the relations between 
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particular components, such as the screen, battery and graphical processer are organised 
correctly, which in turn allow the iPad to translate various forms of energy, such as electric-
ity, into images and sound. Material thresholds are the limits that determine the potential 
affects an object can generate, which in turn define what that object is. For example, 
smashing an iPad’s screen creates a situation in which the screen can no longer translate 
touch into digital data, but now gains the capacity to cut or slice through skin, translating 
sharpness into pain. Smashing the iPad’s screen is a process of surpassing the objects 
absolute material threshold and in doing so creates a new object. From an affective per-
spective the iPad with a smashed screen becomes more closely related to a knife or cut-
ting blade, than another tablet PC because it now shares more affects with a knife (a ca-
pacity to cut) than with a digital computer (it can no longer process data). 
The purpose of developing an account of inorganically organized objects and affects  is 
threefold. Firstly, while Deleuze (1988) emphasises the non-human character of affect, 
many current studies begin and end with affect as experienced by a human being through 
their particular emotional capacities. For Massumi (2002), emotions are personalised af-
fects. For example, an image may cause the hairs  to stand up on the back of our neck (an 
affect) and be personalised into the emotion of fear. While there is  undoubtedly a link be-
tween the affective and the emotional, this paper conceptualises affect as force that has 
the capacity to transform the corporeal and material basis of the human body in ways that 
are not reducible to a subject’s emotional state. Developing an account of inorganically or-
ganized affect offers another way of approaching the affect / emotion nexus.  
Secondly, developing a theory of inorganically organised objects and affects attempts to 
add conceptual clarity to the distinction between the cognitive and non-cognitive that is of-
ten invoked in theories  of affect (Anderson 2006). Affect is  regularly discussed as operat-
ing on a reflex, or unconscious level (Massumi 2002). Discussing the phenomenon of 
laughter in the work of William Connolly, Ley’s asks whether a distinction between the 
cognitive and the non-cognitive is helpful:
“Is Connolly implying that, by analogy with the pain reflex, laughter can also be understood 
in reflex terms? If so, he is implicitly arguing that far from being a complex, social-cognitive 
phenomenon, laughter as an expression of amusement can be conceptualized as an 
automatic response to stimuli without regard to the meaning those stimuli might have for 
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us, since they are intrinsically capable of triggering a laugh reflex” (2011, 461-462).
An account of inorganically organised affect seeks to show where particular affects 
emerge from and thus show how particular forms of reflex are the product of the develop-
ment of particular technical objects, through theorising their particular material components 
and thresholds. In this case, the cultural, somatic, technical and historical cannot be sepa-
rated into distinct or discreet categories because the material components and thresholds 
of an object are intimately related to their design, manufacture and use.  Returning to the 
iPad example above to clarify this, the capacity of the screen to resist smashing (which 
emerges from the objects material relations and thresholds) are dependent on a whole 
range of broader economic and political processes around manufacturing safety stan-
dards, the history of glass production and consumer rights amongst many others factors.
Thirdly an account of inorganically organised affects allows us to understand how particu-
lar affects travel and are transmitted between and across particular bodies  and environ-
ments. This  is pertinent, because critiques of affect often ask how such transmission is 
possible. As Steve Pile suggests:
“The space between bodies  is not bridged by pipes and cables, but is an invisible field 
within which bodies are always already located. But what is  the nature of the ether that 
carries affects? How do we ‘pick up’ affects? And how far do they reach – from one body to 
another, across a room, through a city, nation, world”? (2009, 16). 
This  paper develops the concept of material thresholds to argue that objects generate and 
transmit affects themselves. As I demonstrate in section two and three, concentrating on 
how actual objects  generate, translate and transmit affect makes it easier to understand 
where affects come from, how they travel and what their effects  are. This in turn is linked 
to the methodological potential of affect as a concept because one can then think about 
and trace the particular actors, objects and institutions, which attempt to shape affect for 
their own ends  and purposes. This point is especially cogent considering critiques of affect 
often point to the abstract and undifferentiated nature of affective accounts  of the social 
(Thien, 2005, Tolia-Kelly 2006). 
The paper answers the question of transmission specifically by suggesting that affects 
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cannot be thought outside of an environmental or ecological context. As section three ar-
gues, affects always travel through an ‘associated milieu’ composed of some form of mat-
ter or another. In this  case affects are a matter of force as  much as  any kind of content. 
Thinking through this associated milieu also allows us  to consider how the same affective 
force has differential impacts dependent on the body or entity it encounters and how single 
objects can create fields  and atmospheres of affects that spread across and through a 
space. 
  
To make these claims the paper forms three parts. In section two I turn towards Stiegler’s 
account of inorganic organised being and Guttari’s account of the technical assemblage to 
theorise how the material components and thresholds of objects shape their capacity to 
generate and transmit inorganically organised affects. In section three I develop the vi-
gnette of sound and tinnitus (an experience of ringing in the ears) as a way to understand 
how technical objects produce inorganically organised affects  and how these affects  shape 
and alter the body. Tinnitus is one of many possible examples that could be used to illus-
trate the idea of technical affect, but is  particularly helpful for two reasons. First, tinnitus 
clearly shows how affects are generated by technical objects and travel through associ-
ated milieus. Second, tinnitus  points to the affective afterlives that specific technical affects 
can have, which are often ignored by literatures that valorise affects as only existing at 
particular moments  of encounter. In conclusion I offer some suggestions as to how an ob-
ject centred account of affect can be helpful for those wishing to study affect empirically. 
2.Theorising inorganically organised objects
There is a variety of existing work on technology and affect (Parisi, 2013, Hansen, 2004, 
Clough, 2008, Thacker 2004). This literature is divided on whether affects  can be differen-
tiated according to their status  as either natural or technical. For Deleuze, whose work on 
Spinoza is so often used as the basis  for thinking on affect: “the plane of nature that dis-
tributes affects, does not make any distinction at all between things that might be called 
natural and things that might be called artificial” (1988, 124). Like Deleuze, Patricia Clough 
critiques the possibility of an ontological separation between organic (natural) and inor-
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ganically organised (artificial or technical) affect. As she writes  in relation to the work of 
Mark Hansen:                                         
“Whereas Hansen’s treatment of new media insists on the difference between the human 
body and human–machine assemblages, between bodily affect and digitization – differ-
ences that hark back to the differences that haunted constructionism, Eugene Thacker’s 
treatment of biomedia reveals the informational substrate of the body and the impossibility 
of the distinctions Hansen seeks to maintain. Thacker argues that the body of bio- media-
tion is  not merely a body-as-constructed, given that ‘constructionism formulates an onto-
logical division between the ‘bio” and the “media,” such that the latter has  as its main task 
the mediation of some unmediated “thing’ (Thacker, 2004: 12)” (Clough 2008 p9).
Clough suggests that there is no distinction between organic and inorganically organised 
affect because as Thacker argues, to be human is to be shaped by and immersed in tech-
nical affects. From this perspective, technology and biology are intimately connected 
through affective feedback loops to the point at which a distinction becomes difficult to 
maintain. For example, Gorman (2012) argues that from an evolutionary perspective, the 
development of cultural technologies such as cooking and how cooked food affected the 
body led to increased brain size. As Stiegler (1998) suggests, these kinds of development 
then encouraged further technical innovation and thus the generation of new inorganically 
organised affects.
I would agree with Clough, Thacker and Deleuze that there is no necessary ontologi-
cal distinction between organic and inorganically organised affect. However, creating a dis-
tinction between these types  of affect is useful in order to further understand how affects 
travel and can change as  they travel. Recognising and highlighting that affects  are organ-
ized in different ways, by both humans and non-humans alike encourages one to trace 
where these affects emerge from, who (attempts) to organise them and for what purpose. 
An account of the material thresholds of objects  and understanding the associated milieus 
that they move through, allows one to focus on the sites and processes involved in the 
production and transmission of affect. These concepts  also allow us to recognise the ma-
terial, discursive and atmospheric structures that enable and cultivate this transmission 
(also see Protevi, 2009). 
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Indeed, technical affects  are not the only kinds of affect that are organized. Alongside inor-
ganically organized affects we could state that many affects are also organically organ-
ized. For example, a spider spinning a web organises its affects into a specific sequence in 
order to produce the material structure that we know as a spider’s web. To unpack the dif-
ference between concept of inorganically organized affect and other forms of affect in 
more detail, we can turn to the work of Bernard Stiegler. In the Technics and Time series of 
books (1998, 2009, 2011), Stiegler develops the concept of “inorganic organised being” 
(1998, 17) to rethink the status  of technical objects  in philosophical analysis. Inorganic or-
ganised matter refers to matter that has been shaped by human beings  for some human 
purpose, while also existing separately from the human (also see Ash 2012). Inorganic or-
ganised matter would refer to all manner of technical things, across  a variety of material 
states and conditions. For example, a hammer would be an inorganic organised form of 
matter, as would a light-bulb or electricity or desalinated water. In each case, matter is  be-
ing shaped and channeled in some way for human ends. Stiegler is  most concerned with 
how various forms of inorganic organised matter operate as forms of tertiary or external-
ised memory, and how that memory shapes humans’ primary retention (perception) and 
secondary retention (memory). In terms of a contemporary example, a mobile phone’s  ad-
dress book replaces  the need for a human being to memorise the phone number of friends 
and acquaintances (Stiegler, 2010). On a more basic level objects  carry a series of so-
matic prompts  in their material structure as to how they should be used. For example, a 
pen encourages one to hold it in a certain way in order to write. In this  case, the practice of 
writing is partially preserved in the pen itself. Stiegler does not discuss literatures sur-
rounding affect in any great detail in any of his work (although on disaffection see Stiegler 
2013). However, Stiegler’s work does  offer ways for thinking about how technical objects 
are affective. Stiegler is keen to emphasise the autonomy of technical objects. Technical 
things are not just the products of, or servants to, human activity but also have an 
autonomous existence outside of their human uses. 
In this regard, the work of Gilbert Simondon is  central to Stiegler’s account of technical be-
ing (see Stiegler 1998, 23). One of Simondon’s  claims regarding technology is that while 
individual technical objects are composed of relations they also exist in a state of (often 
fragile) homeostasis (De Boever 2012; Combes 2012; Chabot, 2013). Homeostasis can be 
defined as a: “relatively stable state of equilibrium or a tendency toward such a state be-
tween the different but interdependent elements or groups of elements of an organism, 
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population, or group” (Merriam Webster, 2013). Simondon argues  that all technical objects 
have to exhibit some form of homestasis in order to exist as such. Giving the example of a 
simple oil lamp, Simondon suggests: “Think of a lamp which would catch fire, which would 
not have this control allowing combustion to be stable. This  lamp would not be destined to 
exist, precisely because it would be self destroying” (Simondon 1970, NP). 
Arguing that inorganically organised objects are homeostatic is not equivalent to suggest-
ing that  they regulate themselves in the same way as  organic or biological bodies. As Si-
mondon suggests:
 “the living conserves within itself a permanent activity of individuation. It is not only  
the result of individuation, like in the case of the crystal or the molecule, but it is the  
theater of individuation: not all of the activity of the living is concentrated at its limit,  
such as with the physical individual. Within the living itself, there is a more complete  
regime of internal resonance, one that requires permanent communication and that  
maintains a metastability that is a condition of life” (2009, 7)
Here Simondon argues that in a physical being, such as a crystal or a molecule, activity is 
‘concentrated’ at its limits. Whereas a crystal’s existence, form and shape is determined by 
its environment alone, a more complex object, such as a human body, can regulate itself 
according to varying internal systems as well as in response to a relationship with its envi-
ronment. Organic processes of homeostasis  in the human body involve receptors, control 
centres and effectors, which can dynamically respond to events both within and outside of 
the body. In the human body, homeostatic processes can also operate in negative and 
positive feedback loops, working to minimise change (such as when regulating body tem-
perature) or to increase change (such as blood clotting when the body is wounded).  While 
living organisms have homeostasis, they also have varying systems that regulate their 
homeostasis. In contrast, for most technical objects the very potential for homeostasis is 
defined in advance, at the moment of that object’s design or manufacture. As Simondon 
goes on to elaborate: 
 “There is, in the living, an individuation by the individual and not only a functioning  
that would be the result of an individuation completed once and for all, as if it had  
been manufactured; the living resolves  problems, not only by adapting itself, that is  
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to say by modifying its relation to the environment (which a machine can do), but by  
modifying itself, by inventing new internal structures and by completely introducing  
itself into the axiomatic of vital problems”. (ibid, 7).”
A key difference between organic homeostasis and inorganically organised homeostasis 
is, therefore, the level of complexity of the systems that regulate an object or body’s ca-
pacity to maintain equilibrium and their (in)capacity to generate new internal regulatory 
systems and mechanisms. Again, in Simondon’s  words: “the living is…the being that is the 
result of an initial individuation and that amplifies  this individuation—an activity not under-
taken by the technical object” (ibid, 7). He suggests that many technical objects’ capacity 
for homeostasis  is  not dynamic; instead it is defined at their moment of manufacture, which 
alters how we consider these objects to generate and transmit affect.  For technical ob-
jects, homeostasis emerges from  the material components  of objects and their thresholds, 
which both contain, limit and enable the object to operate as  it should and in turn shape 
the kinds of affect it can generate. In the case of the oil lamp discussed above, if the sides 
of the container were too shallow, or the wick too close to the body of oil this could cause 
the flame to become too large and destroy the whole object, rather than produce a steady 
flow of light. In other words, once technical objects  have been manufactured they can 
have a series of unanticipated and unthinkable consequences because they have to have 
a degree of homeostatic autonomy from the humans that made them. Similar to Paul Vi-
rilio’s account of the ‘original accident’ (2007), in which the invention of the train brings with 
it the invention of the train wreck, Stiegler suggests that technology exhibits an evolution-
ary tendency to diversify and complexify through processes of emergence. Just as one 
technology brings with it new potential capacities and relations, these potentials also 
shape how the proceeding technologies emerge. The invention of the computer is a good 
example, bringing with it the potential for the development of the computer game (which 
was never conceived as part of the computers original design).
As such, while any piece of technology is autonomous from human beings, technology can 
only operate or make sense in relation to a broader ecology of technical objects. Guattari 
terms this ecology an ensemble. As Guattari puts it “the technical object…[is]…nothing 
outside of the technical ensemble to which it belonged” (1995, 36). For example, a smart 
phone requires a battery in order to operate, which requires a charger to charge the bat-
tery and a plug socket to plug the charger into and so on. In this example, while the phone 
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call is  what matters to the human user, the phone call is  only possible because of a 
broader technical ensemble that underlies it. Returning to Deleuze’s account of affect, any 
technical ensemble requires the exchange of a complex series of affects to take place be-
tween these particular objects for the phone call to take place, such as  a human voice to 
affect a microphone, which translates soundwaves into electrical signals and so on. 
Technical objects  operate as sites of translation, where affect is produced and translated 
into different states and forms for different purposes. How a technical object produces and 
translates affect is dependent on the particular material components that make up an ob-
ject and the material thresholds of the object that enable its homeostatis. Guattari dis-
cusses the relationship between technical objects’ homestasis  and their material thresh-
olds through the operation of a simple lock and key. Within this operation Guattari argues 
that two forms of threshold are in play, which can be termed the objects relative material 
thresholds that exist between the components  that make up that object and the absolute 
thresholds (that Guattari terms a diagrammatic threshold), which are the thresholds that 
need to be maintained for an object to be homeostatic. In his own words:
“Two types  of form, with ontologically heterogeneous textures are at work here: 1) ma-
terialised, contingent, concrete and discrete forms, whose singularity is  closed in on 
itself, embodied respectively in the profile FL of the lock and by the profile of FK of the 
key. FL and FK never quite coincide. They evolve through time, due to wear and oxida-
tion, but both forms must stay within the framework of a separation-type limit beyond 
which the key would cease to be operational; 2) ‘formal’ diagrammatic forms, sub-
sumed within this separation-type, which appear as  a continuum including the whole 
range of profiles FL, FK, compatible with the effective operation of the lock” (ibid, 43). 
Here, the capacity for the key to affect the lock (and vice versa) is dependent on the mate-
riality of the lock and key, including their shape and the material they are made out of. If 
the key is  made out of clay for example, then the key will be too soft and not open the lock. 
Alternatively, if the key is made from the correct metal, but is very old and worn, the tum-
blers inside the lock would fail to operate and the door would also remain locked. As Guat-
tari puts it:
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“Ferric ore which has been insufficiently worked, or deterritorialized, retains  irregu-
larities  from the milling of the original material, which would distort the ideal profiles 
of the lock and key…A lead or golden key risks bending in a steel lock…This phe-
nomenon of a formal threshold can be found at all levels of intra- or inter-machine 
relations…” (43-44).  
In relation to the notion of affect, the locks  capacity to affect the key and unlock the door is 
ultimately limited by the tensile strength of the gold or steel from which the lock and key 
are composed.  If forced or wrenched in the lock, the key may bend or snap and the ca-
pacity for the key to open the door is lost. In doing so the key’s  homeostasis also breaks 
down and re-establishes itself as a new object, with new affective capacities. For example, 
the broken key may no longer be able to open a door, but is now capable of cutting mate-
rial such as cloth or paper, according to its new relative material threshold (its newly 
sharpened edge). However this objects  new homeostasis also has a new absolute thresh-
old beyond which it can no longer operate as a cutting edge. If blunted against steel the 
object would then meet and exceed its  absolute material threshold and in doing so be-
come another object. 
Here affect, understood as the capacity to affect and be affected by, is relative to the par-
ticular material components and thresholds of the objects in question. For Deleuze, affects 
can be categorised as either positive or negative in the sense that entities can either in-
crease or decrease capacities to act. Developing Guattari’s account of the threshold, we 
might argue that the affects  technical objects generate can be differentiated according to 
the thresholds  within which they translate affect. Here affect cannot be reduced to either 
increasing or decreasing the objects capacity to act, but shaping the thresholds within 
which different kinds of force travel and are experienced by different beings. Returning to 
the lock and key, the shape of the key determines how and where the lock and tumblers 
experience the force of turning the key. The force of a human hand swivelling the key in 
the tumbler distributes this force along the length of the keys profile and places increased 
pressure on the cut profile of the key where the material is  thinner. In this example, affects 
emerge from the outcome between the different components of lock and key and are 
translated into different kinds of force, which then affect different points of the lock and key 
in different ways. 
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To summarise then, an inorganically organised affect is an affect that has been brought 
into being, shaped or transmitted by an object that has been constructed by humans for 
some purpose or another. As the lock and key example shows, while humans can design 
material thresholds into objects to attempt to control the kinds of affects that are gener-
ated, technical objects always have the potential to exceed the intentions of their design 
because they have a homeostatic autonomy that exists outside of any one humans  grasp. 
Material components and thresholds can be reworked, modified or simply broken down, 
which in turn generates a whole new set of thresholds within which affects can operate. 
The difference between organically organised, inorganically organised and any other kind 
of affect that you may wish to mention is therefore a difference in degree, rather than in 
kind. The key point is to highlight who or what attempts to organises the material thresh-
olds of an object and for what (attempted) purpose or end.  
Taking the notion of the inorganic organised nature of technical objects seriously allows us 
to focus on how affects  are generated through encounters between technical objects 
within an ensemble and translated, which in turn generates particular affects as human 
encounter them. Developing Stiegler’s account of inorganic organised being and Guattari’s 
account of material thresholds allows us to think about the ways  in which affect consists, 
subsists and proliferates between organic and inorganic bodies and how inorganic organ-
ised objects  work to shape the potential affects a person may experience when encounter-
ing a particular technology. 
3.Associated Milieus and the transmission of inorganically organ-
ised affects 
In what follows, I want to use the example of sound and the phenomenon of tinnitus (a 
ringing in the ears) to make three points to illustrate and unpack the theories developed in 
the previous section. First is  to show how inorganically organised objects generate affect 
and travel through and shape associated milieus. Second is to show how an account of 
inorganically organised affects allows us to understand how the same affect can generate 
different effects depending on the bodies and objects involved. Third is to show how inor-
ganically organised affects, such as sound, can reorganise the material thresholds of the 
body. 
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Humans have been creating sound and technologies  to transmit sound for thousands of 
years. Today, the most common forms of technically produced sound include acoustic in-
struments, Public Address systems, music sound systems and machinery. From a scien-
tific perspective, sound is  understood to be composed of sound waves. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2012), sound waves are a “wave of compression and rarefac-
tion, by which sound is propagated in an elastic medium such as air”. The greater the am-
plitiude of a sound wave the more energy it has and thus the louder it will sound to a hu-
man observer. Man made sound, such as sound produced by speakers, generate sound 
waves by pushing and pulling a speaker cone, that in turn vibrates the air in front of the 
speaker, creating a sound wave. 
Returning to Guattari’s (1996) account of technology, we could understand the air that is 
used by the speaker cone to be an associated milieu, which, in turn, is central to the pro-
duction of the technical affect the speaker is designed to produce (sound). From this per-
spective, an associated milieu can be defined as a material medium that allows or enables 
an affect to travel. In the example of a speaker, air becomes an inorganically organised 
object as it is shaped by the speaker cone, which vibrates at a particular frequency. This 
vibration subsequently organises the movement and shape of the air and creates a sound 
wave. The greater the amplitude and intensity of the speaker’s movement, the louder this 
sound will be and the further it will travel across space. The volume, frequency and dis-
tance a sound can travel are therefore intimately linked to the relations between the com-
ponents of that object and the thresholds of the object that produces that sound, as well as 
the thresholds of other objects in a particular milieu. For example, how far amplified sound 
will travel depends on the power and size of the speakers used as well as the objects that 
make up the environment in which the speaker is placed. The sound waves produced by 
small, low powered speakers will be stopped by the material thresholds of brick walls, 
whereas larger speakers will be able to alter the threshold of the brick, translating sound 
into vibration and then back into a sound wave, meaning that the sound wave can travel 
through that wall. 
The concept of associated milieu can help us  understand how the same affective force can 
have shared, yet have different impacts on the humans and objects exposed to these af-
fects. Following Stiegler (2011b), we could argue that associated milieus, such as  air or-
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ganised into sound waves, become the site for the transmission of what he terms collec-
tive secondary retentions. Stiegler suggests that collective secondary retentions are forms 
of memory that have been widely diffused and adopted by a population of individuals. 
These retentions are “both secondary – because they have been conceived, selected, pro-
jected and lived by others, and have constituted their own pasts, from out of their own pre-
sents…and collective, common, inherited by everyone as the past of everyone” (2011b, 
112). These collective secondary retentions  are realised in a number of ways from shared 
forms of language, to writing, to posture. As Stiegler puts it: “to walk is already to raise 
oneself in this sense, and the[se]…styles of walking, gaits…are already bodily techniques, 
social facts” (ibid, 116). In relation to sound, at a nightclub the transmission of soundwaves 
from the club’s  PA system are the conditions of possibility for the shared activity of danc-
ing. At the same time, multiple bodies may experience the same associated milieu, but be 
very differently affected by this milieu. For example, the day after visiting a night club, inor-
ganically organised affects  of sound may have manifest themselves in the form of a tinni-
tus perception for some club goers. 
Medically, tinnitus is defined as: “an auditory perception in the absence of an external 
source of sound” (Weisz et al 2007, 1479). Most people have experienced tinnitus of one 
kind or another, usually as a ringing in the ears the morning after visiting a loud event or 
nightclub. However, for those with successive forms of damage, tinnitus can last a week, a 
month or even a lifetime. Tinnitus  is thought to be caused by soundwaves entering the ear 
canal and damaging the sensitive hairs  on the ear that vibrate and translate these sound-
waves into signals processed by the brain, although current medical research is  inconclu-
sive (Saunders, 2007). Some accounts suggest that tinnitus  is not exclusively caused by a 
single organ, or a dis-function of that organ (such as  the flattening of the hairs on the inner 
ear); it “must involve abnormalities of both cochlear function and the processing of tinnitus-
related signals within the nervous system” (Jastreboff and Hazell 1993, 8, Eggermont and 
Roberts, 2004). More recently work by Tzounopoulos  has hypothesised that the experi-
ence of tinnitus could be maintained through plastic changes in the cortex, specifically “a 
region of the brainstem called the dorsal cochlear nucleus (DCN), a site of integration of 
acoustic and multimodal, sensory input…[which]…could “lead to long-term changes in the 
communication between neurons” (2008, 1). In this case a tinnitus perception is enabled 
by, and distributed across a number of sites in the body, rather than reducible to a single 
organ.
14
In the example of a night club used above, the PA system, the air and other objects that 
make up the club environment act as the basis of collective secondary retention, which are 
then individualised within different clubbers’ eardrums, brains and nervous systems. De-
pending on previous hearing damage and the sensitivity of the ear, some will experience 
very little tinnitus, while others may experience a strong perception of ringing. As such, the 
material soundwaves generated by the PA system have singular impacts on particular bod-
ily and cortical dispositions, because different night club goers are composed of organs 
which have different material thresholds that in turn shape how affects such as  sound-
waves are experienced. At the same time, the affects that sound waves generate are also 
collective and shared, because the bodies exposed to the sound waves were present in 
the same milieu. 
Examining an individual’s experience of tinnitus more closely allows us to understand how 
inorganically organised affect can create tangible effects in humans by altering the mate-
rial thresholds  of organs in the body. For example, tinnitus is a fundamentally temporal 
phenomenon. It has a specific starting point (although one may not be aware of when ex-
actly this  was) and can also fade away until it is no longer experienced. Inorganically or-
ganised affects, such as soundwaves, can therefore produce after-affects through altering 
thresholds that in turn shape temporal horizons of action and anticipation for the tinnitus 
subject. This can be experienced by long-term sufferers of tinnitus  as anxiety and frustra-
tion at the seemingly unending and constant experience of the ringing perception. 
In these cases, the initial soundwave that creates the experience of tinnitus alters the 
threshold between what Stiegler terms primary, secondary and tertiary retention (namely, 
perception, memory and exteriorised memory), invoking all three modes in the present of 
perception. The tertiary retention of tinnitus (the initial affective soundwave that generates 
the tinnitus) affects the body through altering the material thresholds of the eardrum to the 
point at which a ringing is  experienced, even when the ear drum is not being affected by 
soundwaves. The length that one experiences tinnitus can then be linked to whether the 
ear drums relative or absolute material threshold has been crossed. If the tinnitus experi-
ence is  only temporary, then it is possible to theorise that the soundwave has only altered 
the relative thresholds between eardrum and brain. If the tinnitus is  permanent then it is 
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possible to theorise that the absolute threshold of the eardrum has been crossed and that 
the eardrum’s capacity to affect the brain and vice versa has fundamentally altered. 
While tinnitus appears to be a perception that stretches seemingly indefinitely into the fu-
ture and exists as a temporal phenomenon in consciousness, tracing the affects that gen-
erated it suggest that the perception of tinnitus is produced by the durability of an altered 
threshold of relations between brain and ear drum. What is retained in perception is not 
the content (the specific pitch or volume of ringing) of the tinnitus, but the altered material 
thresholds between body, brain and eardrum which gives rise to the specific ringing. As  the 
example of soundwaves and tinnitus  shows, affect works through the possibilities of the 
milieu in which it is  enmeshed. The temporality of affect is shaped by the material affor-
dances of the objects and mediums that it encounters and displaces. In other words, af-
fects can have traceable points  of emergence and traceable afterlives. In the case of tinni-
tus, these after lives are retained by the body and directly feed into subjective experience. 
4.Towards an object centered account of affect 
This  paper has theorised technical objects as having a homeostatic autonomy, generated 
by a series  of material thresholds, which in turn frame their capacity to affect and be af-
fected. Through a range of examples, the paper has shown how these thresholds also 
shape the affective capacities of the human body. We could call this type of intervention an 
object centred account of affect, in the sense that it seeks to understand how affects 
emerge from, and are translated by, objects themselves. In conclusion I want to outline 
some of the possibilities this type of account offers social scientists interested in studying 
affect, particularly around issues of methodology.
Rather than just existing or actualising in moments of encounter, we could state that af-
fects travel across and through material environments. In doing so, affects are translated 
as they meet and are transformed by the material thresholds of objects. A vocabulary of 
translation and travel may be more helpful than one of encounter and actualisation, be-
cause this  vocabulary offers  a number of ways for rethinking the notion of ‘historical’ or 
‘social’ ‘contexts’, which writers such as  Leys (2011) and Thien (2005) argue are missing 
or absent from accounts of affect. Rather than a pre-existing or surrounding frame in which 
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activity takes place, context can be rethought as extending, translating chains of material 
affects, which have varying durabilities. This can be explained by returning to Ley’s (2011) 
critique of Connolly’s (1999) account of laughter discussed in the introduction. Ley’s sug-
gests  that laughter cannot be reduced to reflex, because this  ignores the ‘social-cognitive 
context’ that shapes why one would laugh. An object centred account of affect would sug-
gest that laugher is neither just a reflex or just a social-cognitive phenomena, because it 
would recognise that the capacity for reflexes themselves emerge from the construction of 
material relations  and thresholds in the body that were created through previously trans-
lated affects.  
An object centered account of affect also re-configures debates around the relationship 
between affective design (Ash 2012), authorship and interpretation. Whereas affect is of-
ten positioned as  concept that is used to decentre humans as rational and intentional 
agents, it can also become a kind of ethereal field of potential that is  seemingly beyond 
human beings control. In doing so, issues of affective design or manufacture become 
downplayed in place of an emphasis on the multiple ways that a piece of technology is 
used or interpreted by a variety of different audiences. 
In this regard, Stiegler’s  work opens a helpful path between classic humanist positions that 
analyse technology as a means and end for human activity and post-humanism, which 
undermines the ontological difference between humans and technology that an instrumen-
tal account of technology is based upon (Badmington 2002, 2003; Wolfe 2010). While 
Stiegler is keen to argue that on an originary level humans and technology emerge in 
movement of “double constitution” (1998, 142), his later writings work to preserve a sense 
of particular individuals and companies who create technical objects  to manipulate and or-
ganize consciousness for particular purposes (Stiegler 2011). Reading Stiegler, Simondon 
and Guattari alongside one another highlights that technical objects  are both manufac-
tured by humans as  well as  having a homeostatic autonomy from humans. Indeed the very 
process of manufacture is  about creating the objects homeostasis so it can operate as  a 
product or object at all. In this  regard the question of intention or authorship over what an 
object can do becomes distributed between the designer and manufacturer as well as the 
associated milieu in which the object is  placed. The affects’ technical objects produce are 
informed by the intention of their designer and at the same time, the homeostasis of the 
object always has to exist alongside an associated milieu, which the designer or manufac-
turer has no control over. An object centered understanding of technical affect therefore 
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requires that one identify the material components that make up an object and frame its 
capacity to affect, as well as  the environment or ecology in which the object is used or 
placed, which dictate that objects  possibility for homeostasis.  Analyzing technology in this 
way encourages  us to think carefully about how the arrangement of these objects shape 
potentials and possibilities for different forms and ways  of life. In relation to the example of 
tinnitus, one could use an object centered account of affect to study the technologies cen-
tral to creating the inorganically organized affects that generate a tinnitus perception. This 
would raise a number of questions. For example, how are specific speakers and environ-
ments designed to organize and transmit airwaves? Furthermore, if these environments 
and objects are problematic for the humans that inhabit them, then can they be redes-
igned?
Taking an ecological view of technical objects and affects  shows that affects can have af-
terlives that linger on long after the force of an encounter has dissipated. In many cases, it 
is  the afterlives of affects  that have the biggest impact on the beings exposed to them. It is 
hoped that the concepts developed here can be used to expand analyses of affect beyond 
an ‘encounter’ or ‘event’ centered model to focus on the temporal and spatial duration of 
affects as they emerge from and are translated by the objects and milieus within which 
they are enmeshed. 
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